In the evolving landscape of online dating, particularly within the LGBTQ+ community, the integration of geolocation features has raised significant privacy concerns.
While dating apps are revolutionizing the way we find companionship, they pose significant privacy risks, particularly through geolocation features. For example, an investigation into popular LGTBQ+ dating apps by Alexey Bukhteyev of Check Point Research has revealed a stark reality: users’ precise locations can be determined through trilateration, despite efforts to obscure this data.
This vulnerability exposes users to potential threats, especially in communities where privacy is not just a preference but a matter of security.
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How can dating apps reveal your location?
Dating apps often use location data to facilitate connection between users, promoting the convenience of proximity. However, this convenience comes at a price. Bukhteyev’s research has shown that through trilateration – a technique for calculating a user’s precise location by measuring distances from multiple points – it is possible to bypass the privacy measures implemented by these apps. Such methods can determine a user’s location within a shockingly narrow range, sometimes accurate to just a few meters.
Bukhteyev experimented with two popular LGBTQ+ dating apps: Hornet and a second unnamed app. For his research, Bukhteyev strategically manipulated reference points and used geometric calculations to refine a target user’s estimated location. To put it simply, using a digital game of hide-and-seek and some clever mathematical tricks, Bukhteyev was able to pinpoint a user’s location with frightening accuracy.
Although the research doesn’t make it entirely clear, Bukhteyev’s experiment represents the extremes of what malicious actors can do to find out a user’s location – particularly state and federal actors who have used dating apps in the past to target LGTBQ+ people found in their country. Even though dating apps already have a major predator problem, the average Tinder or Grindr user isn’t tech-savvy enough to emulate Bukhteyev’s research.
However, for users, this highlights the need to exercise caution in the permissions granted to applications, particularly those that access geolocation data. Using features that allow you to hide your location can provide protection against unwanted tracking.
On the other hand, app developers need to strengthen their data protection measures. The LGBTQ+ community in particular deserves full protection given the increased risks they face in regions where their rights are not fully recognized. The discrepancy between the intended security of these apps and their actual vulnerability highlights a critical gap in user protection.